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ABSTRACT 
The problem of approximating an interval null or imprecise hypothesis test by a 
point null or precise hypothesis test under a Bayesian framework is considered. In 
the literature, some of the methods for solving this problem have used the Bayes 
factor for testing a point null and justified it as an approximation to the interval null. 
However, many authors recommend evaluating tests through the posterior odds, a 
Bayesian measure of evidence against the null hypothesis. It is of interest then to 
determine whether similar results hold when using the posterior odds as the primary 
measure of evidence. For the prior distributions under which the approximation 
holds with respect to the Bayes factor, it is shown that the posterior odds for testing 
the point null hypothesis does not approximate the posterior odds for testing the 
interval null hypothesis. In fact, in order to obtain convergence of the posterior 
odds, a number of restrictive conditions need to be placed on the prior structure. 
Furthermore, under a non- symmetrical prior setup, neither the Bayes factor nor 
the posterior odds for testing the imprecise hypothesis converges to the Bayes factor 
or posterior odds respectively for testing the precise hypothesis. To rectify this 
dilemma, it is shown that constraints need to be placed on the priors. In both 
situations, the class of priors constructed to ensure convergence of the posterior 
odds are not practically useful, thus questioning, from a Bayesian perspective, the 
appropriateness of point null testing in a problem better represented by an interval 
null. The theories developed are also applied to an epidemiological data set from 
White, LaFaunce, and Mohammed (1989) in order to illustrate and study priors for 
which the point null hypothesis test approximates the interval null hypothesis test. 
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1 Introduction 
Imagine we own a factory that produces nuts and bolts. Every month we wish 
to determine whether the equipment is manufacturing nuts of the incorrect size in 
terms of diameter. Consequently, we take a random sample of nuts forged at the 
plant and measure the diameter of each. Assume the optimal diameter for these nuts 
is 80 . Hence, to check whether the machinery is molding nuts of optimal diameter, 
we can evaluate the point null or precise hypothesis test 
Ho : () = Bo vs. HA : ()=f. Bo (1) 
that, say, the unknown mean diameter length of nuts produced, 8, is equal to the 
optimal diameter length, Bo. 
However, even if the nuts are constructed with slightly too small or too large 
diameters, they will still fit snugly around the companion bolts. Hence, we may not 
want to worry about fixing a machine that produces nuts with diameters very close 
to the optimal. A more appropriate analysis may then include a test of the interval 
null or imprecise (as called by Verdinelli and Wasserman (1993)) hypothesis 
H0 : I 8- Bo I:::; E vs. HA. : I 8- 8o I> E, (2) 
where E > 0 is "small." Unfortunately, it may be difficult to specify E. How far off 
from optimal can our nut diameters be while still fitting tightly around the bolts? 
Intuitively, a small E may lead one to conclude that H0 in (2) is essentially the 
same as the point null hypothesis Ho in (1). Hence, the precise hypothesis test 
might be a good approximation of the imprecise hypothesis test. Through this 
potential approximation we can avoid the difficulty of determining E by using a 
point null hypothesis as a surrogate to model a situation better fit by an interval 
null hypothesis. 
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Let us formulate this question in a general statistical setting. We wish to choose 
between two hypotheses, denoted Ho and HA, about a parameter, say e, from the 
space 0 = R. To this end, assume a random variable X with density f(x I B), 
dependent on the unknown B, is observed. Furthermore, suppose we have some 
information about B prior to running the experiment. For example, in the nuts and 
bolts situation, we possess data on a particular machine from previous months. By 
inco_rporating this information into our analysis, we may be able to get a better 
evaluation of the machinery. In a Bayesian framework, this prior knowledge is typi-
cally formulated in terms of a probability distribution over 0 since the information 
can seldom be precisely determined (Berger ( 1985)). Upon collecting data, the prior 
opinions about a situation are updated and presented as a posterior distribution, the 
probability of e given the data X. The posterior distribution can be used to decide 
which of H0 or HA is "correct" based on prior beliefs and data. To accomplish this 
task the posterior probability under Ho, P(0o I x ), and under HA, P(GA I x ), are 
calculated. The odds in favor (against) H o can be determined by calculating the 
ratio P( 0o I x )/ P( 0 A I x ), termed the posterior odds and denoted PO from here 
onward. For example, if PO = k, then the null hypothesis, Ho, is k times more 
likely than the alternative hypothesis, HA. This Bayesian measure of evidence is 
conceptually appealing because it is the odds in favor of one hypothesis given both 
prior information and data (Berger (1985) section 4.3.3). 
Similar to the posterior odds, the prior odds, P(0o)/ P(0A), denoted PIT, deter-
mines the odds in favor (against) H o prior to data collection. Another measure used 
to evaluate evidence in a hypothesis testing problem is the odds ratio PO j PIT. 
This odds ratio is termed the Bayes factor. denoted BF, and is interpreted as the 
increased (decreased) odds in favor of H o upon collecting data as compared to the 
odds in favor of H0 prior to data collection. 
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Getting back to the problem at hand, we are interested in determining whether 
the point null or precise hypothesis test ( 1) can approximate the interval null or 
imprecise hypothesis test (2). This problem can be reformulated as whether POt, 
the posterior odds for testing the interval null hypothesis, converges to PO, the 
posterior odds for testing the precise hypothesis, as E approaches zero. Analogously, 
we can ask under what framework will BFe converge to BF as E approaches zero. 
Many papers including Berger and Delampady (1987), Berger and Sellke (1987), 
Delampady (1989), Dickey (1976), Gomez- Villegas and Sanchez-Manzano (1992), 
and Verdinelli and Wasserman (1993) consider this problem; but each discusses 
solutions in terms of only BF or bounds on BF and posterior probabilities over 
classes of prior distributions. 
However, according to the hypothesis testing methodology established in texts by 
Berger (1985), Casella and Berger (1990), DeGroot (1970), Phillips (1974), Pollard 
(1986), and Robert (1994) to name a few, the primary Bayesian measures for evalu-
ating evidence in a testing problem are the posterior probabilities or posterior odds. 
For applications of Bayesian hypothesis testing evaluated through posterior odds in 
practice see Bernstein et al. (1989), Brown and Klein (1986), Fienberg (1990), Press 
(1989, sections 7.6, 7.7, 8.4 and 8,6), Reckhow (1990), Reynolds (1982), and Zellner 
(1984, p. 296-297) as examples. As for the Bayes factor, it can be shown that BF 
is sometimes relatively insensitive to reasonable choices of prior and represents the 
impact of the data on posterior probabilities. Therefore, Berger (1985) suggests 
reporting BF a.nd eliciting the reader to calculate personal posterior opinions by 
multiplying BF by his/her prior odds. We thus question whether the approximation 
of the imprecise test by the precise test is valid in terms of the posterior odds. 
In this article we first show that POe does not converge to PO as E approaches 
zero under a. standard prior framework. Consequently, for this commonly applied 
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prior structure, the point null test does not approximate the interval null test. We 
then develop classes of priors for a variety of situations under which the approxima-
tion does hold. However, a researcher may be reluctant to represent his/her prior 
opinions by an element from the appropriate class of priors because these functions 
have some undesirable properties. Hence, in terms of PO, the approximation of the 
interval null test by the point null test may not be valid from a practical viewpoint. 
Add_itionally, we study the correspondence between the convergences of PO and 
BF. We prove that convergence of BF is a necessary consequence of convergence of 
PO. In some circumstances with which an experimenter may be confronted we find 
the approximation is not even valid in terms of BF. Therefore, in general from the 
Bayesian perspective, a researcher may be unwilling or ill-advised to test a point 
null hypothesis in the place of an interval null hypothesis. 
In Section 2, we will present the basic prior setup and relevant formulas necessary 
in the ensuing parts of the paper. Section 3 contains the main results concerning 
classes of priors under which the posterior odds and Bayes factors converge in various 
testing scenarios. In Section 4 we apply the results from Section 3 to a data set 
aimed at determining the optimal time postbreeding for a pregnancy examination 
in dairy cattle. Section 5 contains a summary of the paper and suggests alternatives 
for scientists when their prior beliefs situate them in a position where testing a 
point null is inappropriate as an approximation to the more realistic interval null 
hypothesis test. 
2 Preliminaries 
The general hypothesis testing setup in this paper is similar to that defined in 
Gomez-Villegas and Sanchez-Manzano (1992). Suppose a random variable X has 
density J(x I B) where B is an unknown parameter from the space 0 = R. Let 
B0 E 0 and assume J( x I B) is continuous at B = B0 • The two hypothesis testing 
situations are defined by (1) and (2). Without loss of generality assume B0 = 0 thus 
simplifying subsequent calculations. 
In a Bayesian framework, for the testing problem (1), it is typical to consider a 
mixed prior distribution P which places mass 7ro E (0, 1) on the point {B = 0} and 
spreads the remaining (1- 7ro) probability on 0 \ {0} according to the continuous 
density 1r( B). Mathematically, the prior distribution, P, can be expressed by 
P(B) = (1- 1ro) is 1r(B) dB+ 7roi(O E B), VB E B, (3) 
where B is the collection of Borel sets of R and I(A) is the indicator function 
of the set A. For the testing problem (2), consider the same prior density 1r(B) 
as used for problem (1), but over the entire parameter space 0. The same prior 
density is used for testing H0 and H0 because the main goal is to determine when a 
point null hypothesis test could be used to approximate an interval null hypothesis 
test. Therefore, the prior information should be incorporated into both testing 
situations in a similar manner. To remain consistent with Gomez-Villegas and 
Sanchez-Manzano (1992) and for ease of presentation, let I{ = {B : IBI ::; E} and 
Iz be the complement of the set I{. Additionally, for theoretical completeness in 
the subsequent proofs, assume f(x I B) 1r(B) is integrable (i.e., assume the marginal 
density of X, m(x), is finite for all x). 
Under this setup, the desired posterior odds for testing the point null hypothesis, 
PO = P(0o) = r.of( x I Bo) 
P(0A) (1- 7ro) J{!i:f:Bo} f(x I B)1r(B) dB (4) 
and the posterior odds for testing the interval null hypothesis (denoted by a subscript 
"t'" ), 
PO = P(0o) 
( P(0A) 
f(J(x I B)1r(B)dB 
Ire J(x I B)1r(B) dB 
( 
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(5) 
can be easily calculated. Here, 0 0 and 0A denote the subsets of the parameter space 
under the null and alternative hypotheses of the imprecise test (2). Additionally, by 
noting that the corresponding definitions of the prior odds are 
and 
PIT= P(0o) = ~ 
P(0A) 1- r.o 
P(00) J~,~(8)d8 PITc = - , P(0A) fJc r.(8) d8 
E 
BF can be calculated in each instance (BF and BFc) using the definition 
BF =PO j PIT. 
3 Convergence of Posterior Odds 
As mentioned in Section 1, the objective of this paper is to determine and study 
conditions on ~( 8), in the general setup of Section 2, under which the posterior odds 
from testing an imprecise hypothesis will converge to the posterior odds from testing 
a point null hypothesis as the interval length,£, approaches 0 in the interval null test. 
Underlying this question is the problem of whether convergence of the posterior odds 
corresponds to convergence of the Bayes factors. The following theorem explains 
part of the story. 
Theorem 3.1 Under the setup in section 2, lime-a PO,= PO implies 
Proof. This theorem clearly follows from the calculations of the posterior odds and 
Bayes factors in Section 2. 
However, the converse does not necessarily hold. 
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Theorem 3.2 Assume 1r(B), the prior density in the setup of Section 2, is contin-
uous and the corresponding distribution is denoted by P. Then lim€-.O PO€ = 0. 
Proof. Notice from equation (5) that, as f approaches zero, the denominator of 
PO€ will approach fe f(x I B)1r(B) dB, the denominator of PO in equation ( 4). In 
addition, since f(x I B) is continuous at B = 0 and 1r(B) is a continuous probability 
density function (pdf), 
< lim sup f(x I B)· j€ 1r(B) dB 
€-+o lOis{ -€ 
f(x I 0) · 0 = 0, 
thus proving the theorem. 
These two theorems indicate that the approximation of the point null hypothesis 
test by the interval null hypothesis test is not valid in terms of the posterior odds 
under the current setup. By Theorem 3.1, we can restrict attention to PO, but 
we need to change the definition of our prior function 1r(B). From the proof of 
Theorem 3.2, the problem reduces to finding a prior function 1r( B) such that 
! € 7ro lim 1r(B) dB= --. 
€-+O -{ 1- 1ro 
This integral is the area under the curve 1r( B) from B = -f to B = f. Conse-
quently, by the crude approximation J~€ 1r(B)dB ~ 1r(O) · 2E, it seems that the func-
tion 1r( B) needs to approach infinity at the same rate f approaches zero in order for 
lim€-+0 J~€ 1r( B) dB to equal a nonzero constant (in particular 1 _:~0 ). Additionally, if 
1r( B) is not restricted to be a function off, then the "base" of the rectangle, from - f 
toE, (Figure 1) may approach zero too quickly as f approaches zero resulting in zero 
area. Alternatively, 1r( B) may explode too fast as B approaches zero (i.e., at a faster 
rate than f approaching zero) resulting in infinite area. Hence, 1r( B) as a function of 
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E appears to be a requirement for n(B) to approach infinity at the same rate that f 
approaches zero, and thus force f~( n( B) dB to converge to a nonzero constant. This 
dependence onE is denoted by writing "nt(B)" instead of n(B) for the prior function. 
Let 
ifBE(-e,E) 
if B rj ( -E, E) 
(6) 
be the prior on 0 for the interval hypothesis testing problem (2) where gt( B) and 
g1(B) are nonnegative continuous functions such that 
The superscript "A" on g1(B) signifies the use of g1(B) as the prior function over 
the Alternative space {B: IBI > E}. Additionally let 
{ no n( B) = 
(1- no)g(B) 
if B = o 
(7) 
if B :f o 
be the prior for the point null testing problem (1) where n0 E (0, 1) and g(B) is a 
continuous function such that 
In other words, the prior functions over the alternative spaces HA and HA. conYerge 
as the interval length, E, approaches 0. Therefore the denominator of PO£ still 
converges to the denominator of PO (recall equations ( 5) and ( 4)). The following 
theorem considers further constraints on 1r t( B) that allow the PO to converge. 
Theorem 3.3 Assume 9t( B) is nonnegative, continuous, bounded in a deleted neigh-
borhood of 0, and of the form g((fJ) = h(E)·p(fJ) for some functions p and h. Further, 
suppose one of 
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holds. If limt-+O ( hCE)) 1 exists and equals a real number L f= 0, and 2p(O) = 1 _:~0 • L, 
1ro E (0, 1), then limt-+O POt =PO. 
Proof. Let k(E) = 1/h(E). Therefore 
where !!:. shows an application of L'Hospital's rule. The second to last equality is 
due to the continuity of gt(B) for all B (and hence continuity of p(B)). By the new 
definitions of the priors, 
f(x I 0) · ~ 
fe f( x I B)g( B) dB 
PO. 
A few remarks are necessary. Firstly, restricting gt( B) to be bounded inside 
some deleted neighborhood of zero (i.e., 3M> 0 such that for some TJ > 0, gt(B) ~ 
M VB E [ -ry, 0) U (0, ry]) prevents the continuous function from oscillating to infinity 
infinitely often inside an interval about zero. Although this assumption may seem 
constraining, recall that 1r f( B) represents the prior information about some param-
eter B in an experiment. It seems unrealistic for an experimenter to describe prior 
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knowledge with a function that oscillates unboundedly and infinitely often in any 
interval of the parameter space. Secondly, assuming 9~(8) = h(E) · 1r(O) simplifies 
the prior form and clearly displays how prior information about (J is incorporated 
into the function. Finally, the remaining sufficient conditions restrict the limiting 
behavior of 9~( 0) as f approaches zero and defines a value of the prior function at 
(J = 0 to force convergence of the posterior odds. 
Theorem 3.3 may not be useful for building a class of priors under which PO~ 
converges to PO. The following corollary makes such a construction simpler. 
Corollary 3.1 If 9~(8) = p(~O) where p(O) is a continuous probability density func-
tion (pdf} with p(O) = 2(1'2'1ra) and priors defined as in (6} and (7}, then 
lim~--+o PO~ = PO. 
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.3, since pis a pdf, the corollary follows 
after an application of L'Hospital's rule to lim~--+0 J:..~ (p(O)/E) dO. 
Hence, any pdf can be easily transformed into a prior function under which the 
approximation of the interval null test by the point null test is valid. Note, though, 
that requiring a prior to be a function of f (an unknown and potentially difficult 
to specify quantity) with limiting behavior as stated in Theorem 3.3 may not be 
realistic in practice. Additionally, the restriction placed on p(O) constrains the 
scientist in his/her choice of prior. Thus, under these conditions, the usefulness of 
the approximation by a researcher is dubious. We will discuss this matter further 
in the next section. 
In some situations an experimenter may want to describe prior beliefs about one 
part of the parameter space by a function 91 and opinions about another part of 
the parameter space by a function 92· As before, we wish to find a class of priors 
under which the precise test approximates the imprecise test using BF or PO as the 
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measure of evidence. Mathematically, the prior density for testing the point null 
hypothesis in this "non-symmetric" prior framework can be written 
1ro if B = Bo 
1r1g1(B) ifB>Bo 
1r2g2(B) if B < Bo 
(8) 
where 1r1 f. 1r2, 1r1 + 1r2 + 7ro = 1, and g1(B) and gz(B) are nonnegative continuous 
funCtions of B. Following a similar reasoning to that of the previous work, consider 
the prior 
{ g1 (B) if e > Bo 7r( B) = 
gz(B) if B < Bo 
(9) 
for testing the interval null where g1(B) and gz(B) are the same functions as those in 
(8). The next theorem follows directly from the definition of the Bayes factor and 
the assumption that 1r( B) is a density. 
Theorem 3.4 Under the prior functions 1r0(B) and 1r(B) described above for the 
point null (1} and interval null (2} tests respectively, if 1r(B) is a continuous pdf, 
then limt-+O BFE f. BF. 
Hence, under a setup like that of Gomez-Villegas and Sanchez-Manzano (1992) 
in Section 2, BFE may not converge to BF (and thus by an argument similar to that 
in Theorem 3.1, POE will not converge to PO). The failure of the point null approx-
imation of the interval null in terms of both PO and BF is due to the assignment 
of specified prior mass on the positive and negative pieces of the parameter space 0 
when testing H 0 . Following the intuition and development preceding Theorem 3.3, 
assume 1r( B) is a function of f. This supposition allows the priors in the interval 
null test (for which particular prior mass is not spread over subsets of 0 ), as E ap-
proaches zero, to account for the different prior masses in the point null test. In 
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other words, somehow, as £ approaches zero, BF € must "pick up" 1r0, 1r1, and 1r2. 
Let 1r(O) depend on£ (denoted 1r€(O)) such that 
9t(O) ifOE(-c,c) 
1r€(O) = g~(O) if 0 ~ £ 
g~(O) if 0 s; -£, 
(10) 
where g€(0), g~(O), and g~(O) are continuous nonnegative functions such that 
fe f(x I 0)1rt(O) dO< oo. 
Theorem 3.5 Consider the priors 1r0 (0) and 1r€((J) from equations (8} and (10} for 
the point null and interval null testing situations respectively. Assume there exists 
h( c) and p( 0) such that g€( 0) = h( e)· p( B) and the continuous nonnegative functions 
g~(O) and g~(O) are such that lim€-+og~(B) = 1r191(0) and lim€-+09~(0) = 1r292(B). 
If g~(O) is integrable over {0: 0 > 0} and gt€(0) is integrable over {0 : () < 0}, then 
lim€-+O EFt = BF. In addition, under the same assumptions as Theorem 3.3 with 
the exception that 2p(O) = 7ro · L, 7ro E (0, 1), lim€-+0 POE= PO. 
The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.3. The main 
difference is that we require more restrictions on the prior functions over the al-
ternative space (g~( 0) and g~( 0) here) to force the denominators of POE and PIT€ 
to converge to the denominator of PO and PIT (recall Section 2 for the necessary 
definitions). Hence, the approximation of the interval null test by the point null test 
for a non-symmetrical prior set up holds under a class of priors analogous to the 
class described by Theorem 3.3. Again, though, this class may not be reasonable 
for a researcher thus challenging the practicality of the approximation. 
A special case of the non-symmetrical prior occurs when an experimenter wishes 
to test against a one-sided alternative, {0 : 0 > 0}, say, as opposed to the two-
sided situation we have been considering. If we think about the one-sided test as 
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a two-sided test with prior mass zero on the portion of the alternative space not 
covered by the one-sided scenario (e.g., { B : B < 0} ), then all the previous work can 
be applied. In other words, a class of priors can be constructed using Theorem 3.3 
such that POf converges to PO and the approximation of the interval null test by 
the point null test is valid. The comments following Corollary 3.1 concerning the 
applicability of these priors still holds however. 
4 Application 
We will consider the practical implications of the theory developed in Section 3. To 
accomplish this task, the previous theorems and corollaries are applied to a data 
set collected by White, LaFaunce, and Mohammed (1989). The data consists of the 
calving interval (number of days from artificial insemination to birth) and pregnancy 
examination interval (number of days from artificial insemination to pregnancy ex-
amination) for 1318 cows on five California dairies. Cows examined for pregnancy 
36 to 68 days post breeding are categorized into groups based on three day intervals: 
36 - 39 days postbreeding, 49 - 51, ... , 66 - 68, and ~ 69 days. Furthermore, cows 
bred 30 - 35 days prior to the pregnancy examination are grouped into one category. 
Thus, the data is divided into thirteen groups. The authors were trying to determine 
the effect of pregnancy examination interval on calving interval in dairy cattle in 
order to calculate the optimal time post breeding for a pregnancy examination. The 
statistical analysis involved a one-way ANOVA with a comparison of group means 
to determine if any of the differences between category means were significant. 
For the purposes of this paper, consider the hypothesis test 
Ho : 81 = ... = 813 vs. HA : not all Bis are equal, ( 11) 
where Bi is the true mean calving interval for each pregnancy examination group 
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i. The first step in evaluating this hypothesis test is to setup a system of priors 
(since the Bayesian methodology is being studied here). Consider the hierarchical 
modeling approach suggested by Berger and Deely (1988) where 
B I {3,0"; 
{3 
N(B, 0"2 I) 
N(y{3, O"'fri), 
U( -oo, oo) 
p 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
and P is a mixed prior probability distribution on R+ (positive real numbers), as 
in (3). The observed mean calving interval, Xi, for each pregnancy examination 
interval i = 1, ... , 13 (in the 13 X 1 data vector X) are assumed independent and 
() = (fh, ... ,(h3f contains the actual group means. Furthermore, a 2 is an unknown 
constant, {3 is the constant mean calving interval under Ho (81 = ... = 813 = {3), 
I is a 13 X 13 identity matrix, and y = (1, ... , 1 f. This model fits nicely into 
the ftamework of the paper because under the prior P, the hypothesis test ( 11) is 
equivalent to 
H o : O"; = 0 vs. H A : a; > 0 (16) 
a one-sided point null test. However, an experimenter is typically interested in the 
interval null test 
(17) 
where E > 0 is "small." For example, one may consider a very small O";. to be 
negligible and hence still accept the null hypothesis that the mass is concentrated 
about the equal cell means. 
As in the previous section, it is of interest to study two measures of evidence for 
Bayesian hypothesis testing, posterior odds and Bayes factor. In particular, can the 
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Table 1: Posterior odds and Bayes factors for the interval null and point null tests 
with the hierarchical prior structure defined by (12)- (15). Jro = 1/2. 
E POt BFt 
0.1 0.0071:3 7.312 
0.001 7.77 xlo-s 7.330 
1 x w-6 7.77 x w-s 7.331 
point null 7.331 7.331 
point null test approximate the interval null test with respect to either PO or BF. 
For subsequent calculations we consider the prior density over a; 
(18) 
where 
* ( 2) a d 2 11"2,2 a'!r = 2(a2 + a?f)3/2 a'!r, (19) 
the "conventional" proper prior suggested by Berger and Deely (1988). As in Sec-
tion 2, the interval null test can be evaluated with prior density 1r:i 2 ( a;) over the 
' 
entire parameter space. In addition, a is estimated by 
the minimum risk equivariant estimator (Lehmann (1983)) as recommended by 
Berger (1980). For this data a 2 = 47.20. Also, Jro = 0.5 is chosen because it 
is considered "noninformative" (Berger and Deely (1988) ). As expected from the 
theory developed thus far, Table 1 indicates that under this setup, using relevant 
formulas provided in the paper by Berger and Deely (1988), limt_,.o BFt =BF but 
limt_,.o POt= 0. In fact, BF = 7.3 (1ro = 0.5 implies BF =PO and P(Ho I x) = 0.88) 
is interpreted as evidence in favor of Ho whereas POt ---+ 0 indicates strong evidence 
against H0 as E approaches zero. Therefore the point null test is not a good ap-
proximation of the interval null test under this setup. As a side point, BF = 7.3 is 
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Table 2: Posterior odds and Bayes factors for the interval null and point null tests 
with the hierarchical prior structure defined by ( 12) - ( 15) and 110 is defined by (21 ). 
f PO€ BFf 
0.1 0.00773 7.312 
0.001 0.0776 7.330 
1 X 10-6 0.0777 7.331 
point null 0.0777 7.331 
typically interpreted as evidence provided by the data in favor of equal mean calving 
intervals for each pregnancy examination group since BF does not depend on the 
prior probability 7ro. This interpretation is different than that inferred from PO, a 
measure sensitive to the prior. 
By Corollary 3.1, if we redefine the prior on 0";. for testing the imprecise null as 
if a; E [0, E) 
(20) 
then if 7rz 2 (0) = Jro/(1- 1r0 ), the approximation of the PO for the interval null test 
' 
by point null test PO will be valid. To obtain this last condition, we take 
'Tr--·1-1 ( 1 ) -l 0- 2&2 + 2&2 (21) 
Table 2 indicates that under the hierarchical model with second stage prior (20) and 
1ro = 0.01048 from (21), limf--+0 PO€ =PO. Furthermore, P(HA I x) = 0.93 implying 
the hypothesis of equal mean calving intervals is rejected, unlike the interpretation 
obtained from BF under the prior (19) with 7ro = 0.5 (note that BF here is the 
same as BF under the previous framework since the same prior is used for testing 
the precise hypothesis in both situations). Of course, the discrepancy between the 
two inferences is partially due to the small prior mass placed on Ho (11o ~ 0.01), a 
restriction forced by Corollary 3.1. 
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The authors may not be comfortable representing their prior knowledge by the 
function (20) though. Two drawbacks are immediately apparent. Firstly, though 
the authors probably believe a priori that the point null hypothesis is false, placing 
such small prior mass on H0 introduces an undesirably large bias towards the null. 
Secondly, the authors might have originally chosen to model the situation by a 
point null hypothesis because it was difficult to set an appropriate interval length in 
( 17). Therefore, requiring the prior function to depend on the unknown E is not as 
intuitively appealing as the noninformative prior considered in (19). Taking these 
issues into account, the authors may not choose to compromise their prior opinions, 
through utilization of 1!"2~2 ( a;), for the sake of testing a point null hypothesis. We 
will mention alternative strategies in the next section. 
5 Discussion 
The point null or precise hypothesis test is one of the most common tests done by 
scientists and experimenters. Unfortunately, it is rare to model a situation with 
an exact hypothesis such as () = Bo that is of scientific interest. Any biases due 
to the experimental equipment or the experimenter taking measurements to test 
this hypothesis will prevent the representation of a hypothesis as a point (Berger 
and Delampady (1987), Casella and Berger (1987)). A more realistic description of 
the problem is a test of the interval null hypothesis () E (00 ±E). However, if the 
point null test can be approximated by the interval null test, then using the precise 
hypothesis to model the situation may not be so unreasonable. 
Previously this problem was attacked utilizing BF as the primary measure of 
evidence. Gomez-Villegas and Sanchez-Manzano ( 1992) show that under a reason-
able framework of symmetric priors as defined in Section 2, BF t' the Bayes factor 
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for testing the interval null hypothesis, converges to BF, the Bayes factor for testing 
the point null, as E approaches zero. Thus for this prior structure, BF indicates that 
the point null test does approximate the interval null test. However, if we change 
the prior structure to impose some asymmetry in the distribution of prior mass over 
the parameter space as in Section 3, the Bayes factors do not converge. The validity 
of approximating the imprecise test by the precise test in terms of BF seems to be 
a consequence of the nice properties (symmetry for example) inherent in the class 
of priors we choose. 
In any case, the literature on Bayesian inference suggests that a Bayesian uses 
the posterior odds rather than the Bayes factor for evaluating a hypothesis test (e.g., 
Berger (1985), Casella and Berger (1990), and Degroot (1970)). The Bayes factor is 
useful for reporting since it allows the reader to use his/her own prior odds PIT to 
calculate the posterior odds (PO = BF X PIT). Hence, we studied the approximation 
of the interval null test by the point null test in terms of PO. Under the symmetric 
prior structure discussed before, the posterior odds do not converge. We did develop 
classes of priors under which the approximation is valid for a variety of testing 
situations when considering PO as the primary measure of evidence (and by the 
work of Section 3, it follows that the approximation holds in terms of BF). However, 
this class of priors has some undesirable properties. In particular, a researcher most 
likely will not desire to express his/her prior beliefs through a function that depends 
on the unknown interval length E and is either unbounded or has infinite area over the 
interval null as E approaches zero. Therefore, the testing of a point null hypothesis 
from a practical Bayesian perspective is questionable. 
Of course, these properties are only sufficient conditions for the convergence of 
posterior odds. There may exist other, more realistic, priors for which precise tests 
approximate imprecise tests. Or, perhaps, the conditions are not only sufficient but 
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also necessary for convergence of the posterior odds. These issues are good problems 
for future study. Be that as it may, under some realistic and commonly assumed 
prior settings, the precise test is not valid as an approximation to the imprecise test. 
Other solutions are available for a statistician confronted with this hypothesis 
testing dilemma. We may think of ways to avoid the approximation altogether. For 
instance, if a researcher insists on doing a hypothesis test, he/she can directly test 
the desired imprecise null hypothesis and evaluate evidence provided by the data 
and by prior knowledge through the posterior odds. In a Bayesian framework, once 
the scientist's prior distributions are determined, such a test is not too difficult. 
Alternatively, a scientist can set up confidence intervals or credible sets instead of 
testing hypotheses, or simply calculate the posterior distribution of() given the data 
x and make inferences about the unknown parameter through this distribution. 
These latter approaches will avert some of the difficulties encountered under the 
Bayesian hypothesis testing paradigm. 
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Figure 1: Crude approximation of area under the curve of1r(B) on (-E,E) 
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